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The Ethics of Humor
Can’t You Take a Joke?

Steve Gimbel
Professor of Philosophy, Gettysburg College
Goodness. I’d like to thank Shannon and thank everyone else who had
a hand in making this wonderful event happen. A lot of you in this little
room. This is great. I have done stand-up for years and I usually don’t play
to rooms this big. This is wonderful.
So the topic is the ethics of humor. Now let me begin with an apology,
see I’m a philosopher, and the way philosophers actually present is that we
write papers and at our conferences we sit behind desks and we read our
papers to the audience. I am not doing that. I am actually going to speak
to you, so let me apologize in advance for this breach in etiquette.
So philosophy of humor, now my interest in this, like it was said earlier,
I am actually a philosopher of physics so my big questions are in the nature
of relativity and if the theory is true what does it say about the underlying
nature of reality itself, so how did I get here? And the answer is on my
40th birthday, which was a few years ago, I was wrestling with a question
and that was the question of the mid-life crisis. Now we can ask these
wiser gentlemen over here is it a real thing or not? Is it a myth that around
middle age there is this sudden urge, and I didn’t know if it was real or
not, but I thought turning 40 I ought to do something to cut it off at the
pass. Now, you know, I teach ethics so, you know, having an affair with a
younger woman is just not an option, the sports car, I drive so slowly Amish
people give me the finger, so this would just have been ironic. So I thought
what is it that I can do that I have never done and I have all my life been
a comedy nerd, just loved comedy, so I thought that’s it! I’ll do stand-up!
So I found a club in Baltimore that had an open mic night and I went
and I worked hard for about six months, tight 7 minutes of material, and
I got up and I did it, and I came off and I thought, all right, check that off
the bucket list but I caught the bug, and so I started performing around
the Baltimore/DC areas, performed at a couple of colleges. It lasted a
few years, and as I was hanging out with these comedians, I realized that
the way they talked about jokes and the way they thought about jokes is
25
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actually very different from the way the rest of us talk and think about
jokes, and it’s different than the way philosophers talk and think about
jokes, and there is a small group of philosophers working in philosophy
of humor and I realized that there was a disconnect between the sorts of
things the comedians would talk about amongst themselves, the way they
would talk, the way they would judge jokes, the way they would draw
the line between what can and can’t, if there is one, and the way that the
philosophers were thinking. And so I started working in this field. There is
a wonderful group that we talked about earlier, it’s called the Lighthearted
Philosophers’ Society. We meet annually down in Florida on Columbus
Day weekend, and basically have our colleges pay to send us to Florida on
Columbus Day weekend, sitting around telling jokes, thinking about the
nature of philosophy and humor.
So what I want to ask today is a simple question. Now before we start that,
I need to draw a distinction, this is philosophy, this is what we do, we draw
distinctions. I want to distinguish between humor and comedy, okay. We
need to distinguish between humor and laughter. Laughter is a physiological effect. Laughter can happen for lots of reasons, right? Could be comedy,
could be laughing gas, could be tickling, right? Clearly laughter different
from humor, but humor and comedy, we want to draw a line between.
Comedy is an art form. So here we’re not using comedy in the sense of
types of classical plays, tragedy versus comedy. Here we’re talking about
comedy as a sort of artistic performance. Now in the roundtable that we
will have afterward, I want to turn the discussion to comedy because I
think there are really interesting questions there, right? Humor is what we
normal people do. You hear a joke at a party, you remember it, you tell it
to your friends. You see something funny on Facebook, you send it to all
of your friends. It’s the sort of telling of jokes that non-comedians do. The
telling of jokes in normal discourse. Now these are clearly related, right?
A lot of comedians tell jokes. Not all of them. But in comedy I think you
have a separate question because we are creating an artificial space for a
particular art form and that comes with its own set of ethical questions.
What I want to look at in this talk is, got a good one for you, that sort of
joking. The sort of joking that isn’t part of a performance. It is performative,
right? It is something you are doing, you are performing that joke when
you tell it and we all know people who butcher jokes, they just can’t tell
a joke, right? So they are trying to perform the joke but they are doing it
badly. So joking is performing but it’s doing so in the course of normal
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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discourse. So what we want to look at in this talk is humor not comedy.
We will get to comedy, I promise, and some of the examples we’ll use will
be jokes from comedy, but what we want to look at here in particular is
this question of ethics in humor.
Now we can’t talk about humor and ethics without talking about two
major figures. One is Aristotle, whom we’ll come to, and the other is Freud.
My favorite Freud joke was on the old TV sitcom Cheers where somebody
asked what’s a Freudian slip, to which Cliff Clavin responded, “It’s when
you mean to say one thing and you end up saying a mother.” Brilliant line!
It only took him 3 seconds. We’ll keep track of you!
So Freud has a big book on jokes and the relation to the unconscious, and
in that work Freud draws an interesting distinction between two types of
jokes: innocent jokes and tendentious jokes. Now innocent jokes are plays
on words, puns, clean jokes, right? What we all think of when we think of
just telling, you know, a joke at the dinner table, assuming your family is
not completely dysfunctional. Tendentious jokes on the other hand come
in two flavors. He argues that there are dirty jokes, jokes about sexuality,
and ethnic jokes, jokes that make a particular group the butt of the joke,
where you’re using a stereotype. Now he focuses primarily on ethnic but
we can enlarge that group, there are lawyer jokes or blonde jokes, right.
Guy comes up to a river, he’s trying to figure out how to get across.
He looks up, there’s a blonde across the river. He states, “Excuse me, how
do you get on the other side of the river?” The blonde looks up and says,
“You are on the other side of the river.”
Right? So the idea here is when we tell a joke like that, what we’re doing
is using an architect, right? We’re taking people with blonde hair and we’re
associating an icon with them. So that’s the sort of thing we’re looking for
when we say ethnic notes. It may be a particular ethnic group, the Poles,
right? How many Poles does it take to change a light bulb? Four: One to
hold the light bulb, three to turn the ladder. That, by the way, is the first
light bulb joke. That’s where our light bulb, that was THE joke that started
all of the other light bulb jokes.
So the idea there is when we hear Polish jokes, the flattened icon that
we get of people of Polish extraction is that stupid and dirty, right? Those
tend to be the two parts of that stereotype. And so Freud wanted to look
at why it is that we tell these two sorts of jokes.
Now we might want to ask what is the central question of this talk so I
think we will want to ask is it morally acceptable to tell and enjoy tendenPublished by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2017
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tious jokes? Right? I just did, but of course I did it as a professional for clearly
scholarly and pedagogical purposes. If we were simply sitting around this
room having lunch, the 50 of us, and I just told those jokes, would there be a
moral problem with that? So that’s the central question we want to ask, right?
We’ll ask later is it okay for a comedian to tell? Because I think that’s a slightly
different question, but if we talk about her, you a comedian? No? Okay. Is
it okay for her to tell those jokes? That’s the question we want to consider.
Now in considering this joke, rather this question, we now turn to
Aristotle. I promised and there it is, I delivered. Okay. Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics, you haven’t read the Nicomachean Ethics, take their
class. Aristotle argues that ethical questions are really questions about the
nature of one’s character, and when you look at the human soul, it’s divided
into two parts. One part deals with the intellectual, one part deals with the
ethical, the practical and the virtues of the practical are always the mean
between two extremes. So if you have too much, it’s a vice; too little, it’s
a vice; down the middle, that’s a virtue. And that’s true, he argues, with
everything. Right? So in the case of humor, if you have too little, you are
a bore; if you have too much, you are a buffoon, which is just a wonderful
word we don’t use often enough. But if you are right in the middle, you
are a wit. And that’s the virtuous way to be.
To be witty is to actualize your potential as a human being, if you want
to be the ultimate human being. What’s your name? Ryan. If you want to
engage your inner Ryanness and transcend your mere self to be more like
Ryan, then you need to be a wit. You need to find that mean between
two extremes. so Aristotle is going to argue that being funny is part of the
well-lived human life.
Now we can use Aristotle to frame the question we have about the
moral permissibility of tangential jokes, right? That is what we can ask is
whether these three categories can be used for our question. And so what
we can do is take these three approaches and set out what are really the
three main moral positions with respect to tangential jokes. Now there are
those who are on the boorish side and those are people who say, innocent
jokes are fine but tendentious jokes are immoral and should never be told.
Most people tend to do that.
The buffoons, on the other hand, are going to say, “Go to town, anything goes.” And in fact now says “Go to anything.” So feel free to go to
anything, any length, no matter what joke you have, let her rip. Right?
Jokes are jokes.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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The wit will say some tendentious jokes are allowed in some context,
so we’ve got again with Aristotle set-up, those who say always, those who
say never, and those who say sometimes.
Now one of the things that we worry about in philosophy are logical
fallacies. That is using poorer reasoning to justify a position. You will notice
that we have three words labeling our three views. Is there one you would
prefer to be? Yes. This is what we call question-beginning language, we want
to avoid this so we will change our labels. We will call the boorish position
the cultural sensitivity position. Right? That’s what we’re saying if we use
the phrase boorish we’re clearly biasing you away from that view. There are
very smart philosophers who take this position: Mary Bergman, Ronald
De Sousa are two prominent philosophers who have argued this. And they
generally give four types of arguments to make the case that tendentious
jokes are themselves immoral, that if you tell them, if you laugh at them,
you are doing something wrong. And those four are that, look, being the
butt of a joke is a harm. Now if I tell retired professor jokes, they will be
hurt. Why? Because we’ll now look down upon them in a way we hadn’t
before, that being the butt of a joke is itself to suffer a harm.
The second is that tendentious jokes entrench imbalances in social power
and grant justification for discriminatory beliefs and practices. That is, we
live in a culture in which there is unequal social power. Some people get
to give the grades. Other people have to cower before us. And so if we
tell jokes about you guys, it only reinforces that you are inferior to us, as if
we needed to reinforce that. So the idea here is that we live in a society in
which there is an imbalance in social power; telling the jokes only ossifies
that difference.
The third is that tendentious jokes are offensive and it’s morally wrong
to offend people. That is, offensiveness is taken as a moral category, right?
This is an approach you here fairly frequently now. It’s just morally wrong
to offend someone, that offensiveness itself is a moral harm, and that if you
are offended by something, that you’ve been damaged and you shouldn’t
damage others.
The fourth is that tendentious jokes are in bad taste. And bad taste is a
moral category. So bad taste is just not a matter of etiquette, right? It’s not
like, you know, using the wrong salad fork. That it is in some sense over
a line. It has caused harm. So that mere faux pas is really an ethical issue.
So these four are the standard arguments that are given by smart people
who want to claim that these sorts of jokes simply ought not be told. The
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2017
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buffoonery position is what we will call “neo-shaftesburianism,” which is a
term I just coined in order to sound smart in front of you. “Shaftesbury” refers
to this man, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Say it
for us. “The Third Earl of Shaftesbury.” Exactly! He was a sadly forgotten
philosopher of the modern period and in philosophy modern means the 16th
and 17th century. For us that’s modern. And he was a fascinating figure. He
was wrestling. He was an author. He wrote some plays. He wrote a number
of philosophical essays. He was writing at a time when he was taking issue
with a view called enthusiasm, which we would now refer to as religious
fundamentalism, that there was a large segment of the population who had a
very literal view of religion and apparently nowhere in the New Testament
does Jesus laugh. And if we are to take the Bible seriously, that means that if
we are to be good Christians, we must not laugh, either.
And so these enthusiasts were quite dower. And he wanted to argue that
humor is an essential part of a well-lived life, that laughter is a joy that one
ought to experience joy. Now he gets into an argument with (Lagnents), the
prominent German philosopher, and the debate is this. Is there any topic
that ought to be off limits to ridicule? Particularly religion. Lagnents says
one ought not ridicule religion. If you disagree with somebody’s approach
to religion, it ought to be a very serious matter. Shaftesbury argues that
ridicule is a test of truth, that if something is true you can’t ridicule it. So
if something is capable of being ridiculed, what it’s doing is it’s demonstrating to us that there is falsity in there that needs to be weeded out. So
that ridicule actually plays very important epistemological role for us, that
if you can make fun of something, that there’s something to be made fun
of. If you try to make fun of something true, he goes back to Aristotle.
That’s what makes you a buffoon. That’s what’s over the line. But if you
make fun of something that needs changing, what you’re doing is you’re
demonstrating that need for change, and that’s a valuable thing.
So we ought to allow absolutely every topic to be open to possible
ridicule because, if it succeeds, that shows it’s problematic.
The neo-shaftesburianism position comes in three different flavors, what
we’ll call the Shakespearean, the nihilistic, and the cultural cohesive. Now
the Shakespearean, the reason I call it this is that in Shakespeare it’s often
the fool and the fool alone who can tell the truth to the king, right? It’s
only the comic, it’s only the clown who can speak truth to power, so the
Shakespearean view takes this neo-shaftesburian approach because ridicule
is a test of truth, so nothing should be off limits as we need to be able to
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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challenge power, which may obscure truth. Right? Now if Tony believes
something, are you going to believe it? “It doesn’t commonly happen.” It
may, well, it does for the exam. Right? The idea is he has the red pen, you
will say what he wants you to say, right? With power comes the ability to
coerce, right? The Shakespearean, neo-shaftesburian position is one which
says we need these jokes, we need tendentious jokes. I need to be able
to tell jokes about people because they are going to be, we can tell jokes
about high school kids, right? Why? There are things about high school
kids they need to come on, right? And unless we joke about them, those
things aren’t going to come out so they’ll realize, oh, okay, I’ll change.
Right? So the idea here is this is better for them, it’s better for society, we
need a place in our discourse to ridicule aspects of our world because that’s
the only way we can effect positive change. So there is a special role for
humor in our discourse.
The nihilistic view, which affects the size of shaftesburianism again, is
called nihilistic because jokes are meaningless, right? Jokes have no meaning
so there is no sense in a moral moratorium since we are only joking. Look,
if I tell you that there is a pirate with a steering wheel attached to the front
of his pants, I’m not reporting the truth. There is no pirate like that, right?
It’s the set-up to a joke. Right? You all know that joke, right? Really?
Pirate with a steering wheel attached to the front of his pants, they say,
well what’s that for? It’s a car, it’s driving me nuts. (Laughter from audience.)
This is an easy room. It’s not that funny. So the idea is, look, it’s just a
joke. It’s not that I’m telling the truth. There was never such a pirate. There
wasn’t! Nor am I committing myself to that belief. I am simply telling a
joke. Right? It’s just a joke. Lighten up. Joking is a special form of speaking. Joking is sort of like fiction, right? I’m creating an artificial world in
which the result is laughter, right? It’s not meaningful. So if anyone wants
to hold me morally responsible for telling jokes, it’s like holding me morally
responsible for things that happened in a fictional story I wrote. It’s like,
that never happened! No pirates were harmed in the telling of this joke.
The cultural cohesive view is one that is put forward largely by anthropologists of humor. There was a man named Alan Dundes who argues,
Kristy Davies is another one who argues in the same way, that jokes are a
social signal that a group has been accepted into the culture well-being,
allowed to maintain their identity as a minority group. So the idea is what
they point out, we talked about Polish humor, you know when Polish jokes
really became the rage? In the 1970s. The big wave of Polish immigraPublished by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2017
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tion is from the 20s to the 40s. We don’t start telling Polish jokes until
Poles are white people, they’re normal people, they’re part of the normal
part of our culture. Now they’re allowed to maintain that identity, right?
They’re allowed to be slightly different while still being us, so they’re not
other, they’re just a flavor of us but a different flavor of us, that what these
anthropologists argue is that when you start to see jokes about groups is
when those groups are no longer seen as scary. We can be funny about
them because they’re our buddies, right? You start seeing Italian jokes, Jewish jokes about the same time. Right? You don’t make jokes about things
you’re really afraid of because that’s not a joking matter. You start telling
these jokes when it’s basically a signal to “you’re in the club.” Right? Now
clearly there are instances of despised communities having jokes about them.
Here’s a very tendentious joke. Around World War II Germans would
tell this joke: How many Jews can you fit in a Volkswagen? 104, 2 in the
front, 2 in the back and 100 in the ashtray. Yeah. That’s a limiting case
joke right there. Right? Because on the one hand it’s like, oh my god. On
the other hand, that’s a funny joke but it’s like ew, you feel dirty realizing
that is a well constructed joke. So it certainly is not always true but what
the anthropologists are pointing out is that it is largely true, that when we
start seeing commonly jokes about a group, in a certain sense they become
innocent and non-tendentious because what we’re doing is embracing that
group, not actually putting them down.
The middle we will call contextualism because, here again, remember that
we said this is the middle ground where sometimes these jokes are allowed,
sometimes they’re not. And this, too, will come in three flavors. The first
is what we can call the identity politics position. That is one can only tell
tendentious jokes about one’s own group. So I could get away with telling
that last joke—why? Because I’m Jewish. Right? And the idea here is that a
tendentious joke might be innocent, that is I might just be telling it because
it’s a funny joke or I might be telling it because I really dislike this group of
people and I’m trying to put them down and get you to think like I do that
these people are inferior. But if I’m part of that group, of course I don’t think
I’m inferior to you guys. Right? So I would only be telling the joke to get
laughs; I wouldn’t be telling the joke to make my own lot in life worse. So
the question is, when we hear a tendentious joke, what we’re dealing with
is a problem that we deal with in philosophy of language called “speaker’s
meaning.” So if somebody says something, if she says something and he says
the same thing, they could mean radically different things by them. Right?
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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So when I hear her say it, I need to figure out did she mean that or did she
mean that? And what we’re dealing with here in a certain sense is a version
of that problem. When I hear somebody tell a joke, is it just to be funny or
is it really underlying an aggressive act against this group? Now the only
time these folks want to argue that I can be absolutely sure this isn’t a bigoted
attack on this minority is when the person is a member of that group because
clearly no one would do that which is a detriment to their own self. So the
identity of politics position says that I’m only allowed to tell tendentious jokes
when they are about my group.
A version of that which we are seeing a lot more of nowadays is what
we might call the humor as the sword of justice position, which is overstated dramatically I think for a reason. And here the claim is you can tell
tendentious jokes that, and the phrase you will hear now, is punch up but
not those that punch down. That is, you are allowed to tell tendentious
jokes about groups that have social power. If somebody has especially power
they don’t deserve, right? Those people we can tell all the nasty jokes about
them we want because what does that do? That levels the playing field.
That brings them down to us. So notice that inherent in both of these is
the same presupposition that we find in the cultural sensitivity position,
that being the butt of a joke is a harm. Right? These people say being the
butt of a joke is a harm so you should never do it. These guys say being
the butt of a joke is a harm but if it’s your own group, you’re not harming
them. These guys say, yeah, it’s a harm and there are some people who
deserve harm. They have special privilege that they don’t deserve so we
will use humor to try to take that privilege away. We will try to diminish
those who are wrongly elevated, thereby creating justice. Now you can’t
punch down, that is you can’t take somebody who is beneath you and tell
a joke about them because what’s that doing? Well being the butt of a joke
is a harm, that’s only further harming them. So you can punch up, you
can’t punch down. Humor can be used to harm but there are some people
who deserve the harm. And this again is a position that I think you’re
seeing much more of.
Now, it’s certainly true that humor can be used to serve social justice.
The last few, which for lack of a better name we will simply call the “correct view,” is that everyone’s fair game. There is nobody we shouldn’t be
able to tell jokes about. There is nobody that we should exclude from our
ability to make mutual jokes with. Right? I have a dear friend who is in
the Italian Studies Department back at Gettysburg, and whenever we see
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2017
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each other, he has a Jewish joke, I have an Italian joke ready to go. And it
doesn’t harm our relationship; quite to the contrary, it tightens it. He’s a
good buddy of mine. Whenever I see Alan across campus, I know a good
laugh is coming. Right? So the idea is that to simply rope a group off would
eliminate the possibility of this sort of interaction. So we shouldn’t take
any group and make them sort of impervious to this sort of joshing. But
that doesn’t mean that all jokes are allowed. Telling a tendentious joke I
want to argue is taking a moral risk. So there are some jokes that are morally acceptable and tendentious. There are other jokes that are tendentious
and are okay. You’re going to tell a tendentious joke? You’re taking a risk.
Are you doing something that is morally allowable or something that is
morally impermissible?
So in order to answer this, we now need to take a step into humor
theory. Let’s get philosophical. So this is actually a controversial statement.
This is part of the project I’m working on. One of these questions, see in
philosophy, and you’ll learn this if you take any philosophy class, the first
thing you do, right? You take a class it’s always Philosophy of _____ (blank).
Take a noun, stick it in the blank, we have a philosophy of it. Right? The
first week of your class will be, well what do we mean by Blank? And
now we need to give a definition, we need to set out the necessary and
sufficient conditions to know when something is that thing because we’ve
got 12 more weeks coming and we want to make sure we’re studying the
right thing. Right? So philosophy of humor, the first thing is what do we
mean by humor? What do we mean by a joke? Now the standard approach,
which I believe is wrong, is that a joke is the perception of an incongruity.
Right? And that’s sort of the general received view. Right? And if you
think about it, it does make a lot of sense. Knock-knock. We will try this
again, people. You’ve been fed.
Knock knock. Who’s there? Two. Two who? No, to whom.
Right? So the idea, think about how the joke works, there’s a set-up that
leads you to think in one direction and then the punch line that makes you
realize, oh, I need to reinterpret that, it actually means this other thing.
Right? And so the standard view, the incongruity view, is that there are
these incongruities and it’s when we perceive them or some theorists think
when we resolve them, that the laughter comes. I want to argue that’s not
true. While it is certainly true that a lot of our jokes are based on incongruity, right, think about the pirate joke, right? There were two ways to
interpret the pirate’s sentence and it had simultaneously two meanings, it’s
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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a pun, and when you come to realize, oh it means this and this, hahaha,
but there are other forms of humor that don’t require incongruity at all.
Right? So there might be some improv people here. Are there?
So he writes half the things earlier and memorizes them, and makes up the
other half. Right? So the idea here is, alright think about improv comedy.
How does improv comedy work. Right? Okay. Give me a celebrity, Justin
Bieber. Give me a color, green, and give me a location, Las Vegas. And
then what do we do? We get the troupe up here and we do something, and
what’s funny is not an incongruity because we started out in congruence,
right? What’s funny is when they’re brought together and all of a sudden
we see a green Justin Bieber in Las Vegas, right, and oh my god, it makes
perfect sense in the scene they created and then we laugh. So what’s funny
there is not the incongruity. What’s funny there is the congruity. Same
thing if you watch Frank Caliendo or Rich Little doing impersonations.
What’s funny there is, god, he nailed that. That’s exactly how he does it.
It’s the congruence. Right?
Similarly, guys have you ever seen this? This is a classic. Robin Williams,
one of his concert videos, does Elmer Fudd singing Bruce Springsteen,
singing the song “Fire,” if you’ve never seen this look this up, Google this.
It is magnificent. Elmer Fudd. That chases you. The Nazis, not so much.
Elmer Fudd. And what’s funny is, is it incongruous? Well, I mean he could
have done Tweetie Bird and that would have been just as incongruous.
What makes the bit funny is oh my god does it work. It fits so perfectly. It’s
just, I mean knock-down hilariously funny. So what’s funny is congruity,
not incongruity. So what I want to argue is that we need a new definition
for humor and what I contended is a playful demonstration of cleverness,
that is I’m making a joke, I’m putting something out there, right? And I’m
putting it out there so that you can admire my cleverness. Right? I’m making a joke to show you how clever I am, and I’m doing it, now playfulness
here I don’t mean, “weeahh.” What I mean is playful as in playing with
your food, which parents hate. Right? What is playing with your food? I
gave you that food, there is one thing you are supposed to do with it and
that is eat it. And what are you doing? Something else. That is, you’re
playing with it. You’re using it for something other than that for which
it was intended. That’s the notion of playfulness I mean. Right? Because
jokes can be mean-spirited, jokes can be self-deprecating, jokes can be not
playful in that way. Jokes can be very dark, right? So it’s not necessarily
light and playful but it is taking something other than it was intended for
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and using it in a way that demonstrates my cleverness. That’s what we’re
going to mean by humor.
Now philosophers of language have a distinction between use and mention, right? So if I say Boston has great restaurants, that’s true. If I say Boston
has six letters, that’s true. But the word Boston is used differently. Once I’m
using it to refer to the capital of Massachusetts and once I’m using Boston
to refer to the symbol, the word Boston. Right? What I want to argue is
that when we use language in humor, we’re also using it in a strange way
but it’s neither using nor mentioning. There is a third way that we’re using
language when we tell jokes and it is what I will use the term acknowledging. That is when I use a word in a joke, when I say Polish, when I say
blonde, when I say pirate, right, the idea is there are certain elements to the
meaning of the word that I am now engaging but I’m not using it in the
same way that I’m using Boston in Boston has great restaurants, to actually
refer to the world. I’m acknowledging the meaning but then I’m using it
as a play toy to show you my cleverness. So I’m merely acknowledging the
term, I’m not actually using the term. But it’s more than just mentioning it.
So there’s this third way that we use language in humor that is really
different from the way we use language in non-humorous ways. It is a
really odd particular way that we use words. Now there are two ways. We
had, we saw one of the views, the nihilistic, neo-shaftesburianism position
which held that, looks like are just joking, they’re just fiction. There are, I
want to argue, such things as pure jokes, and a pure joke is when I am just
demonstrating my cleverness. That’s all I’m doing is I’m just joking. But
there are other times, and this is a phrase that I take from now Senator Al
Franken who, in his book Rush Limbaugh is a Big Fat Idiot, coins the phrase
“kidding on the square,” which he says using a joke to express a belief,
that is sometimes we use jokes just to get people to laugh. Other times we
do use humor to express actual propositional content. That is, I am trying
to say something with this joke; I’m just using a joke to do it. Sometimes
there are certain subjects that are just so touchy we don’t want to actually
say it so we make it into a joke. Other times there are things that are so
delicate, sometimes we do it in order to be brash, right? But there are times
where we do kid on the square, that is we use jokes to tell what we think
is the truth. Think of political cartoons. A political cartoon is meant to be
kind of funny, but it is meant to say something. It is meant to lampoon this
particular figure or it is meant to really demonstrate metaphorically, right,
the nature of this situation. So there are times when we use jokes purely just
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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for laughs, but there are other times when we use jokes to actually express
things. And that’s an important difference. Right? Now I want to argue
that that makes different kinds of joke telling morally distinct categories.
So the conversational quip, right, if you’re coming up with something
off the top of your head, you can often get away with things you couldn’t
if it was a premeditated joke. Right? That is, that you hear two things and
what you can do, you often bracket it. Well “one might say” or “well, if I
was a bigot” you’d say, and you’re just drawing that connection, and what
you’re doing is you’re demonstrating at lightning speed in the course of our
conversation that you just drew a connection that nobody else saw in a way
that’s really sort of clever. So the conversational quip I would argue often
has the least moral responsibility attached to it. That is, if you’re making a
quip, you’re just acknowledging this meaning, acknowledging that meaning and showing that you can connect them in this way nobody else saw.
And so what you’re really doing is demonstrating that cleverness, and so
there is no sense in taking that person who just acknowledged that some
people connected this way and attributing that belief to them. I think that
is different from both constructed comedy, which we’ll talk about in a bit,
but when we have a comedian who . . . “Comes onto the stage, it’s great to
be here in Cleveland!” . . . right? Now, what is that comedian doing? That
comedian is walking into a room full of people who look like that: “Make
me laugh; go ahead.” Right? And so this person’s job, you guys are here,
you go to a comedy club, these boxed lunches are going to cost you $8
and you gotta buy two drinks, right? You’re paying money for this clown
to make you laugh. Go ahead, monkey, make me laugh.
And so there is a sort of contractual obligation, right? My job is to figure
out what you find funny, to go there and to get the laughs from you, and
so there is, I think, a very different dynamic there. So what the responsibility of that performer is, is a complicated issue which, again, we’ll talk
about in the next session. But I think that’s different from the repeated
joke. That’s the joke that you hear, you remember, and you think is worth
bringing up in conversation, “You need to hear this one,” and then you
tell that joke. Right?
Now the question that gets asked in essence to your audience is why
did he tell that joke? And here’s where we need to bring in one of my
absolute favorite philosophers. If you’re taking a philosophy class, take one
in which you read Paul Grice, one of the most wonderful writers we have.
He coins this phrase “conversational implicature” which is magnificent.
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What it means is there are oftentimes where we say something by saying
something else, right? So suppose we’re talking about an over-tired professor and all of a sudden we see him, and we say, “Oh, beautiful weather
we’re having, isn’t it?” That’s a weird thing to say. That has no relation to
the conversation we were having. Grice argues that there are rules that
have to be followed in order to have a conversation, that conversation
requires a certain, it’s a rule-based activity. And when somebody breaks
one of those rules, it could mean they’re mentally ill, could mean they’re
just decided not to have a conversation with you, but what it really means
is probably something else. so if we’re talking about somebody and all of
a sudden I start talking about the weather, what do you realize it means?
Oh, here’s here, stop talking. So I didn’t say, “The old guy’s here, stop it,”
but I said that, right? So what we will often do is say something by saying
something else and that we come to understand what was really intended
by the breaking of one of these conversational rules. That’s what’s called
an implicature. Now after a joke, if somebody tells a joke and people call
them on it morally, the first thing they always say is, “I was only joking.”
And so we see, you know, there are some cases where you can claim that.
Now how do we know whether someone is only joking? In a certain sense,
we need to make a conversational implicature. We need to decide whether
this person thought this joke was really that clever that it bore repeating
or whether the person was really making a bigoted statement and is trying
to cover it up with, “I was only joking.”
I want to argue, and again this is hardly trivial, that one of the criteria
that we can use is how funny that joke is. If a joke really is that funny, then
you can say, okay I understand. He was impressed by the structure of that
joke, by the construction, that’s a really good joke. But if the joke isn’t that
funny, what did the person probably mean? They probably mean that the
bias that is present in the stereotype in that joke is probably the case, and
so that tendentious joke is in fact kidding on the square and the person is
making a bigoted statement.
So what I want to argue is that when we look at tendentious jokes, I don’t
think we should be able to rule them out altogether. All right? My jokes
with my buddy, Alan, I don’t think are in any way morally problematic.
We have the utmost respect for each other and those jokes only serve to
deepen the bond. At the same time, I don’t think we can take the view
of others, right, in the comedy we may want to talk about the comedian
Anthony Jeselnik.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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Yeah, that was great! I wish everybody could see this. There was initially
a snort and a smile, and then there was this grimace of pain. That is exactly
what he’s going for. So what he does is he takes the too soon question,
right? Is it just too soon? He violates that intentionally. He will take every
horrible disaster that causes human harm and he will immediately make a
joke about it in order to press that line, to say there is nothing we shouldn’t
be joking about and largely he gives this wonderful interview in the New
York Times. He gives the neo-shaftesburianism line that, look, my job as
a comedian is to help you make meaning of things. And if there are some
things that are untouchable, some things that are sacred cows, that’s going
to lead, since he argues, to fascism. That we need to put everything on the
table and that we need, even while the wound is still open, we need in the
same way that Shaftesbury argued to ridicule. Now it becomes painful to
watch. And so the question is, is he over the line or not? And I think he
intentionally tries to be over the line in order to, I think in part, create
this sort of conversation. So I think clearly there are going to be elements,
there are going to be jokes that we have to say, “Dude, no.” Right? That
was just not okay. But the fact that we can say there are tendentious jokes
that are allowed and there are tendentious jokes we have to rule out doesn’t
mean that it’s never the case. So how do we draw the line? I want to claim
that it’s an esthetic criteria, that if the joke is that funny, you get away with
it. If the joke isn’t that funny, you should not have told that joke. And that
ought to strike you in some sense as somewhat controversial.
This is philosophy, people. We like to say controversial things and then
ask for questions. Or we can have people just walk out on us. That’s how
controversial this is. So with that, I will say thank you and ask for questions. Questions or jokes.
audience : Well it’s a very clever and enjoyable presentation . . .
gimbel : So you’re saying this was all one big joke?
audience : I actually, yes, I’m going to say that is the definition of humor

seems to me, ____.
gimbel : Ah, well done
audience : Because, if that’s all humor was, if that was its essence, why on
earth would anyone ever play the game of _____.
gimbel : I think that’s perfectly fair. I think when you look at humor,

it certainly is the case that well executed humor in certain context will
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generate pleasure. Daniel Dennett has a wonderful big book where he
argues that the structure of the brain is such that we are forced to leap to
inferences with such speed in order to survive, so evolutionarily it’s bred
into the brain to take shortcuts and inferences that will allow us to run
away from the tiger before we sit and process okay, tiger, tigers eat meat,
I am a human being, human beings have flesh, you know, by this point
you’re lunch. So the idea is that the human brain reacts before it has good
reason to, but then it continues to process and if the brain finds an error,
it corrects it. Now what has evolved over time is that this error correction
is a positive force and so we have evolved a means of regarding ourselves
for error detection and that, he argues, is laughter. And so what we’re
doing in comedy is just exploiting this structure of the brain which has
been bred into us, and so I know how you’re wired and so I am going to
set up a situation which leads you to think one way, I’m going to give you
a punch line which makes you realize there was an error in my way of
thinking, you’ll correct the error and then you’ll reap the emotional benefit
that comes from this evolutionary, and so the idea there is that humor is in
certain ways connected with pleasure but it doesn’t mean it always is. Right?
Like I say, I hung out with stand-up comics and stand-up comics were
always being dumped. Which on the one hand is very good for material,
but the reason they were always being dumped is they didn’t know when
to stop. They would tell jokes and you would see them sometimes having
fights with their significant others and they would be using humor as a
weapon, and it was not funny; it was nasty. So in that case I don’t think
the humor does create this sense of mirth and I think the reason why it’s
almost omnipresent in philosophy of humor is that philosophy of humor is
written by a bunch of people who love to tell and hear jokes. So for them
that’s what humor is about, but when you see humorous people, they’re
often actually quite dysfunctional. It’s interesting, if you look at surveys,
you know, think about this: Top 5 things, what do you want in a romantic
partner? Almost everyone will put sense of humor in that top 5. Right? And
yet the people who have the most developed sense of humor, who really
work hard to make a professional life out of a sense of humor, are horribly
dysfunctional and part of it is they use that humor not just for creating
mirth but also for creating pain, also for self-deception. We use humor
for a hundred different purposes, one of which I think, and I don’t know
if Dennett’s right or not, this takes an evolutionary biologist who would
have to do a lot more, and I’m not sure how one would even do the sort of
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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research to get the evidence needed to justify that sort of evolutionary claim.
I mean, it’s a wonderful just-so story that, if it were true, would explain, but
I think one of the reasons why we do seek out humor, we watch Comedy
Central, we watch sitcoms, we go to comedy clubs, support live comedy,
one of the reasons we do that is there is a pleasure involved, unless you’re
seeing Anthony Jeselnik, in which case it could be quite painful.
audience : (unintelligible comment)
gi m be l : Interesting, and so there was the need to complete

it even though, so you’re the person who goes into the dining hall, gets something and you really hate it but you have to
clean the plate before you go back and get something you want.
So, I mean, I think there is a reason why but I don’t think it undermines
what’s happening here because I think what those comics are doing is they’re
both, when they’re on stage with the stool and the mic demonstrating
their cleverness to these people, but I think also with their partners they’re
demonstrating their cleverness and in that sense asserting superiority which
leads the partner to say, “Yeah, see ya.”
audience : So you talked about evaluating whether someone gives a bigoted

statement or whether it’s a joke based on how funny the joke is, what about laughing
at other people’s pain? Say you’re walking with your friend, your friend slips on a
patch of ice and as soon as you check if they’re okay you’re laughing your ass off
and you’re rolling around on the floor and so how does that play into this how/why
that you’ve created and what about like when we see people we don’t know who
are skateboarding and they do a jump and they land and hit their nuts on the bar,
you know? Everyone’s laughing because it’s hilarious, you have movies are centered
around this sort of slapstick comedy like the Daddy Daycare and movies like that.
How does that type of humor fit into this system?
gimbel : Sure. Going back to Buster Keaton. Now I want to argue, and

there are some humor theorists who want to put these two in the same
category, that is humor is that which we find funny, which may end up
being circular but the idea is what they’re looking at is there’s a certain
phenomenon, there are things we see and we laugh at, now how do we
make sense of that? What I want to argue is that there are two different
sorts of things. I think there is found funniness, you can see something
and find it funny, versus constructive funniness, which I think is humor,
so I don’t necessarily think that there are times when you see somebody
slip on the patch and when the line that’s often taken is that, well look, if
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real harm has been observed, you’re not going to find that funny, you’re
going to rush over and make sure the person’s okay. I think half the time
we’re stifling the laugh until, so we did find it funny, we just won’t allow
ourselves to show it because that will make us seem insensitive to our
friend despite the fact that, oh man, your feet were about 3 feet above
your head and when you came down, you should have seen the look.
So you know, Mel Brooks says the difference between comedy and
tragedy, tragedy is when I cut my finger, it’s bleeding, it hurts. Comedy is
when you fall into an open manhole and die. Right? What he’s arguing is
that if, you know, you’re not directly experiencing the pain, now hopefully
you’re an empathetic person, right? We know that you’re the best of all
human beings so clearly you have a well-developed sense of empathy and
surely empathy is a central psychological component that’s required for one
to be a moral human-being.
audience : What about creating physical humor? We have these ___ that are

scripted and played out and of course the actors themselves probably don’t get hurt,
but some of the funniest movies actually happen, like you read how they shot the
movie and the actor did get hurt or he was doing something stupid, and that’s the
final scene that got put into the movie because it was the funniest.
gimbel : Yes, but you’ll get Buster Keaton, Charlie Chaplin, right? Early

film comedy was all about the sight gag. And I think there is certainly something there. Now it may be, you know, in the case of Keaton and Chaplin,
that it was so clever the way they set it up, so that it builds tension and then
something wacky happens, and so really what they’re doing with images is
similar to what we’re doing with words. I think M.C. Escher, if you look
at certain Escher works, I think they’re visual jokes. That is, you look and
it’s like, wait a minute, it’s, oh, that’s hilarious! So I think that process can
be replicated non-linguistically. And I think the thing with Escher is like,
man, that’s really clever. Had those posters in my dorm room, too. Right?
At the same time, your friend wasn’t being clever; your friend just hit a
patch of black ice. So I think that you may be pointing to a weakness in
my position where I want to say these two things are separate. Others will
say, no, they’re very similar things. We’re laughing at both of them. We
should have a single view that counts. I think it’s different. I think you can
find things funny that aren’t humor, and I think a number of comedians
aren’t humorous. There are shock topics, for example, who we know that
if we’re emotionally overwhelmed, one of the reactions will be to laugh.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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I mean, there are some people I’m sure you all know who laugh at highly
inappropriate times and they can’t help it. It’s not that they find it funny,
it’s just that they laugh under the stress and I think a comedian whose job
it is in part to create laughs, and you can do it through humorous or nonhumorous means, right? I think there are others of these cognitive imputes
that will cause laughter that aren’t necessarily humor. Now, if you want to
be a good philosopher, you can say, “Steve, you’re wrong! They need to be
part of the same category. You’re making a category mistake.” I’m trying to
argue they’re different. Maybe it’s because I’m tied to a theory, but I would
argue that slipping on the ice in reality is different from Chaplin slipping
on the ice, but you may want to say, “Well look, you’re just observing,
you’re seeing the same thing and they’re both funny for the same reason.”
I think it’s a very good question.
audience : (unintelligible) . . . if you’re saying like, I was dumped and all these

terrible things happened and everyone laughs at you, like that’s not a demonstration
of cleverness, that’s just kind of sad.
gimbel : I think there’s a difference. We all have people, friends, who

are just whiners and then we have those who are self-deprecating. And
I think if you listen to Richard Lewis, right? One of the great Jewish
kvetching comics, right? Everything is always wrong and he’s going to
tell you what’s wrong with his life, and you wouldn’t believe. Right? I
think it is. I think self-deprecating humor, when, Jewish humor largely
self-deprecating. Freud deals with this significantly, why would groups do
this to themselves? And I think in the case of self-deprecating humor, what
we’re doing is humanizing ourselves, is that, right, the philosopher Robert
Solomon says, “I think the Three Stooges are very funny. Why? Not because
of Mo hitting people in the head, but because of Larry and Curly getting
hit on the head.” That is, what we get is we feel a sense of sympathy, that
is what humor can do contrary to what say Plato and Hobbes say, which is
that humor is superiority over someone, what he says is oftentimes what’s
funny is we now can empathize with you, we can see your pain and say,
“Oh, I’m a poor schmuck, too!” Right? I’m, you know, bad things to me, a
bad thing happened to you, now look, we’re both human in our fallibility.
And so self-deprecating humor, right, the difference between just whining
and complaining and self-deprecating humor is taking that bad thing that
happened to you and telling it in a clever way. So what I’m doing is I’m
using my cleverness not in the way these comedians, you know, having a
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fight with their partners are, you know, beating them over the head and
showing that I’m superior, is I’m using my cleverness in essence to diminish myself and make myself more approachable. So we can use humor in
a number of ways and I think one of those ways is really, in essence, I can
show my cleverness in making myself more human. And so that’s what I
think is happening with self-deprecating humor. I think it’s very much a
common usage and I think we can account for it in this.
audience : Whether it’s ___ or real, why is a pratfall funny? That doesn’t tie

in with this congruity or incongruity ___ that you mentioned.
gimbel : Incongruity theorists are going to say it is the incongruity, that

normally I’m walking and I take a step, and normally one step just follows
another and now suddenly an unexpected thing happens. And so it’s the
unexpectedness of it. Somebody, like Solomon is going to say that I saw what
happened to you was a bad thing, bad things happen to me, trust me I get it,
I fall down when I’m in fancy dress to give a presentation, too, now suddenly
I sympathize with you. You know, why we find it funny, I mean, in essence
I want to argue that’s a psychological question. Who do we ask? We ask the
psychologist. So why is that funny? Funny, I think, is a cognitive state, it’s
a state of mind, and philosophers love to talk about states of mind as if we
owned them, where we really don’t, that’s a matter of social science, and I
think in philosophy of humor we often make this mistake in that we lapse
into sort of a priori social science. We try to do psychology without the lab
rats. You know? We try to do psychology from our ivory tower instead of
getting down there with the observables, and so that’s a question that I think
is a wonderful question that I would want to hand off to the psychologist.
audience : You’re saying you don’t know and ask a psychologist.
gimbel : Yes.
audience : Okay, fair enough. So (unintelligible) if something physical happens

like you fall over and then somebody makes a joke about that, would that still be a
conversational quip or would that just be like, Hey, would that be something different?
gimbel : I think the question is how quickly it’s done. So this table almost

fell over and if I had come up with something like that, we would have
thought of it as a conversational quip, whereas if you had been telling this
story later, so you had to really set it up so you had time to think about:
a) should I tell this story; b) how to tell this story. I think that becomes a
different category of utterance that gets judged differently.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/4
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audience : Why would telling the story be funny? Would that go back to the
psychology thing?
gimbel : I think that’s very, yeah, that is a psychological question but it

also has, you know people who tell stories amazingly funny. What’s the
adverb? Funnily? Humorously! There are some people who just know
how to tell a story and there are other people who just, aw, they’re awful.
Part of it is tightness, part of it is making sure the punch is there, part of
it is building it up. Timing. Exactly. There’s an artistry that some people
have, some people don’t. You can work on honing and crafting. so I think
certainly those are elements that I think psychologists need to work. And
there ought to be friendly relations between philosophers and psychologists
because, you know, they work on parts of question we work on, but I think
too often we do things that really should be their job. And I think, you
know, that’s a great question but I think that’s part that needs to go to them.
audience : And so your position about judging jokes stays off of how funny the

joke is (unintelligible). Now I don’t know, because you only had an hour to give your
position, but I think that it would need to be nuance more, because I wouldn’t say
kidding on the square is always wrong if it’s not funny. Because I was just thinking
about the political race nowadays and I think a lot of people would agree that, even if
the joke is not funny, it’s okay to make a joke about Donald Trump because he has
caused, he will probably cause harm to others, based on what he said in the media,
you know, about building a wall, Muslims, etc. So is that okay to tell a joke that’s
really not funny about him, but it’s hitting on the square.
gimbel : You’re exactly right. I don’t want to argue that all kidding on

the square with tendentious jokes is morally wrong, but when it’s morally
wrong, that’s what it often is. So you’re right. There are times when we
want to use humor as the sort of justice, that humor is a weapon that we
want in our arsenal, that we certainly want comedians who will challenge
the status quo, right? Pryor, Carlin, what made them so magnificent is they
were pointing out problems in the culture. Bill Hicks, you know, the next
generation, right? Pointing out real structural problems with the nature of
our society and one of the roles, and I don’t think all comedians need to
be this way, but there ought to be social critics for comedians because it is
incredibly powerful and I think you’re exactly right.
audience : But then we have to judge, well who can we make fun of in not

just the political realm but just in general, like who can we, because if we’re saying,
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okay, it’s okay to make fun of Donald Trump because we think he’s a bad person,
then we need some criteria of why we think he’s a bad person, and like who we can
actually criticize here.
gimbel : Yes, but the question then becomes when are jokes in a different category than other sorts of criticisms. So I can criticize lots of people
and maybe I’m right in criticizing them, maybe I’m wrong in criticizing
them. The question is are joking utterances fundamentally different? Do I
get judged differently if it’s a joke? In this case, I don’t think it’s the case.
I think that we would go back through the standard ethical question of
what can I say about whom, whether it’s a serious comment or a joking
comment, right? So, you know, if I make a joke about John Kasich, which
is really hard because there’s just, I mean, god, it’s like making a joke about
vanilla ice cream, but not even French vanilla. Right? The idea here is it’s
hard to make but, would it be different if I leveled just a normal criticism
or if I framed it in a joke, kidding on the square? I would think we would
use the same moral criteria which means that there isn’t anything special in
that case about joking. So maybe there is, maybe there isn’t. I think in that
case there probably isn’t and so basically we don’t have a new philosophical
question, we just have the usual philosophical questions about free speech.
Right? What can I say? What should I be allowed to say? What should be
off. And I think there are cases in which humor is a special category of
speech. I think in those cases I think it’s just speech and so we go back to
the conversation we have been having anyway.
audience : A little bit about morality of the recipient of the joke because, you

know, when somebody’s telling it there’s part of the group that (unintelligible) tells
where they’re coming from, but if somebody tells a joke to me and it’s clever and
off-color, and I laugh it for one of the clever reason, and people don’t know why I’m
laughing, so sometimes it’s both a conscious choice to not laugh at something funny
because of the perceptions of others.
gimbel : I think that’s absolutely right. We often take laughing at a joke

as a sent to the stereotype used in the joke. That is, if you found the joke
funny, you must be saying, “and the stereotype that was used in creating
the joke is true of the world.” I think the problem is in that inference.
That is, maybe it’s because I’m somebody who has tried for years to write
jokes and that when I look at a joke I really look at the structure, I look
at the architecture, I look at, you know, the craftsmanship, and that joke
about the Volkswagen, god is that a dark joke but it’s a good joke. Really,
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it should tear at you in this way. I mean, I think laughing, what I want to
argue is that laughter is a physiologic response. We don’t choose to laugh.
We can choose to try to stifle the laugh, we can choose to fake laugh, and
we do that often. There is a psychologist from the University of Maryland,
Bob Provine, who has written a book called Laughter, where he examines,
I actually took my Intro to Psych from him. He studies what he calls
contagious behavior. So his latest book looks at three: laughter, yawning,
and the passing of gas, all of which apparently are if you see, hear, or I
suppose smell somebody else, why farts are funny, that’s a different question, the inner 8-year-old in all of us, right? There is higher likelihood
that you’re going to engage in that activity. Laughter, I want to argue,
following Provine, is in large sense there’s a social way of laughing and
there’s a biological way of laughing where it just comes out of you, and you
may be, we’ve all had this, you’re ashamed that you laughed at that joke
but you laughed at it, not because you chose to laugh. You didn’t sit and
think, okay, laugh, not laugh, laugh. It just erupts out of you. So I think it
is, in the way Daniel Dennett argues, there is something happening in the
brain so I don’t think it’s right, if you guys were here and this guy starts
yawning, do I get offended by that? Now there are a lot of professors who
would, right? But, you know, we used to work at the Naval Academy and
so what would happen is I would be lecturing and all of a sudden a student
would go like this and then after awhile he would sit down and someone
else would pop up. And I thought, okay, is this just you know, mess with
the civilian, sort of mid shipman whack-a-mole? Turns out no, if you fell
asleep in class it’s dereliction of duty. You get reported and get your pay
docked. You get in trouble. If you’re standing up, it’s harder to fall asleep.
So, you know, the idea is maybe he was walking guard duty up Euclid,
I don’t know. But the point is he may be exhausted for other reasons. It’s
like physiologic response. It isn’t he’s saying, “Steve, you’re boring.” And
I think in the same way that we do interpret that, right? If I look out and
I see my audience yawning it’s like, man, I’m offended. But should I be?
And I don’t think I should be because it’s a physiologic response. He’s not
saying something about my lecture. All right? It’s just my own insecurities
coming out. In the same way, I think honest laughter, what the psychologists
call Duchenne laughter, which is this sort of explosion of sound, I think
it’s an anatomical effect. It’s something physiological. So I don’t think we
can attach moral worth to it in the same way that, you know, you may
be married and there may be somebody who walks down the street and
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your brain goes, whew. But you didn’t decide that. It just, you know, you
decide not to act on that because you’re a married man, right? But the
initial whew is just a physiologic thing that happened in your brain. Well,
we can make jokes about that later but tendentious as it would be, but the
idea then is that I think in that sense we do attribute moral meaning to
something that may not deserve it, but now there are other ways that we
do show acceptance of certain jokes. One is re-telling them and I think
that does, so when you see the politician who is forwarding the racist joke
about Obama, it’s like, well look, you took the time to re-tell this joke,
why are you re-telling it and I think part of it, if you’re judging it, part of
it has to be the humor but part of it when we make the Grice implicature,
the inference, is also what are these person’s beliefs, and if we had reason
before to believe that you probably have these racist tendencies, then I think
it’s also a good inference to say that telling that joke, even if it’s funny, it’s
going to reinforce a rational belief that you do hold these biased views.
audience : (unintelligible) it’s a physiological thing and so as you’re telling it,
might kind of see kind of a hang on, where’s this going? I do not want to be laughing
at that? It’s something you think ahead of time, but if it hits you off guard, then
that kind of spontaneous laugh, then you re-think it and went oh, I shouldn’t have
laughed at that, or whatever, but yeah.
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